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1. Introduction
In our ever-changing economy, few trends last so long that they may be used to
characterize the developments from the industrial revolution until today. Yet over the
centuries, two phenomena seem to have stood the test of time: every year, on average,
economic output grows by a few percentage points (Romer 1986). And, through
the years, economic activity has always agglomerated into small areas, instead of
spreading out evenly (Krugman 1991a).
Not surprisingly, economic science has had some things to say about these two mat-
ters. However, in terms of models, the treatment has been rather upside-down. As
for growth, the Solow (1956) model explains transitory adjustment processes, but
the persistence of growth is an assumption rather than an outcome. Agglomerations
are usually studied with models based on Von Thünen (1842), which show how the
existence of a center affects the hinterland. The center, however, is also assumed
rather than derived.
There exists an interesting connection between the de¿ciencies of these two ap-
proaches, and it is this connection that will be the theme of this survey. The inability
of both models to generate the phenomena that seem so characteristic of real life
is caused by the market form that is used. Both assume that economic activity is
exclusively conducted by ¿rms that are in full competition. This market form is in
accordance with the ¿rm’s technical speci¿cation, namely, it is assumed that all
¿rms are subject to constant returns to scale. It is easily seen that this assumption
severely limits the possible outcomes.
If production is conducted under constant returns to scale, each separate factor in
production faces decreasing returns. When growth is based on the accumulation of a
subset of factors, this means that the economy cannot grow without bounds, and ends
up in a steady state with zero growth.1
In location theory, the spatial impossibility theorem of Starrett (1978)2 states that a
model with mobile agents on a closed, homogeneous space, facing a CRS3 production
technology, can never explain the occurrence of agglomerations. Land rent will dis-
perse economic activity without any countervailing force, because dividing up prod-
uction over many locations leads to no loss in ef¿ciency.4
1 For a detailed analysis, see Section 3.
2 The theorem is replicated in Fujita (1986).
3 When no ambiguity may arise, I use the expressions ‘constant returns to scale,’ ‘constant returns,’
and the acronym CRS interchangeably.
4 The clash between economic geography models and the need to specify the market structure is
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Given these shortcomings of the CRS framework, it would seem tempting to use a
wider class of ¿rms, including those with increasing returns to scale. However, with
the relinquishing of CRS, the assumption of full competition becomes untenable. The
occurrence of other market forms greatly complicates the analysis, and allows for few
analytical results.
Fortunately, a concise model of monopolistic competition introduced by Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977) can be used to circumvent these problems. Among the upheaval that
it caused in many areas of economics (see Buchanan and Yoon 1994) , the model has
allowed a new class of theories of growth and geography to be constructed. One of
the characteristics of these new theories is that their main phenomena, growth and
agglomeration, are now a consequence of the model, rather than an assumption.
This paper will brieÀy look at the monopolistic competition framework, and surveys
the endogenous growth theory and economic geography in the light of it. It turns
out that many interesting results in the two branches of literature can be attributed
to the same fundamental properties of the monopolistic competition framework. The
interplay between growth and geography is therefore not purely coincidental. While
the models that show this were only recently made rigorous, their conclusions have
been anticipated decades ago by such economists as Kaldor (1970) and Myrdal
(1957) :
“[...] the movements of labour, capital, goods and services do not
by themselves counteract the natural tendency to regional inequality.
By themselves, migration, capital movements and trade are rather the
media through which the cumulative process evolves—upwards in the
lucky regions and downwards in the unlucky ones.”(Myrdal 1957, p.
27)
The antiquated notion of ‘cumulative causation’ is revived today as a process caused
by complementarities in the model.
I will ¿rst look into the nature of monopolistic competition and the complementarities
that characterize it. This is done in Section 2. The ¿ndings are then used to provide a
selective survey of endogenous growth theory (Section 3) and economic geography
(Section 4). The two strands of literature are brought together in Section 5, and
Section 6 concludes.
discussed at length in Krugman (1995).
3
2. Complementarities and the monopolistic competition framework
In the classical framework of economics, many important results are obtained under a
broad set of assumptions. For instance, the propositions of welfare economics as they
may be found in Arrow and Hahn (1971) or in Takayama (1985, p. 185) , guarantee
that in general, decentralized market outcomes are socially optimal.
The theory assumes, among others, that all producers of goods are in full competition.
This assumption implies a number of important simpli¿cations: under full competi-
tion, one producer’s pricing decision does not inÀuence the market in which she
operates. Also, no producer makes a pro¿t, and prices should equal marginal and
average costs. These simpli¿cations allow for simple pricing rules in the absence of
strategic considerations. In this environment, a great number of analytical results may
be derived.
As noted by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977, p. 297) , the existence of a unique and optimal
market equilibrium can be in jeopardy for at least three reasons, one of which is that
potential economies of scale may not be used. Allowing economies of scale, however,
means letting go of the CRS assumption. This alters the behavioral assumptions that
are appropriate for the ¿rms (Helpman 1984) . Increasing returns imply, for instance,
that the largest ¿rm has the lowest average costs, and is able to push the smaller
competitors off the market. Even if this may seem realistic for some sectors, it makes
it much harder to derive analytical results.
There is a case for abandoning CRS however. The assumption tends to bend reality,
and paints a world in which economic transactions are basically a zero-sum game. In
a CRS economy, it is just as reasonable that all people divide their time over the same
range of activities, as having each person specialize in one activity and allowing trade.
Clearly, this outcome is unsatisfactory as a reÀection of real economic activity. It goes
as much against common sense as it goes against the founding words of economics as
a science, dedicated to the productivity gains from dividing labor (Smith 1776, p.13)
.
The issue whether to assume CRS thus turned out to be rather crucial for a coherent
model of general equilibrium, but unrealistic in practice. This left economists divided
for a long time:
‘... there seem to be two traditions, which persist. On the one hand
there are those who are so impressed by what has been done by the
CRS method that they have come to live with it on the other, those
for whom scale economies are so important that they cannot bring
themselves to leave them aside.’ (Hicks 1989, p. 12)
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Among the efforts to bridge the gap was the work by Chamberlin (1933) and Robinson
(1933) , who sketched an alternative market form to the full competition implied by
CRS. Their framework, monopolistic competition, held the promise of reconciling the
two camps, but was rejected by most economists because of supposed inconsistency
(Heijdra 1997) . It was after the mathematical rami¿cations of the monopolistic
competition framework had been studied by Spence (1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977) that this alternative to CRS became widely used, especially in industrial
economics, trade theory, growth theory and economic geography. Although it is ‘a
very restrictive, indeed in some respects, a silly model’ (Krugman 1998, p. 164) , it
allows the economist to focus on the effects of increasing returns without worrying
about strategic interactions between ¿rms. The apparent arbitrariness of the model is
not denied, but taken for granted, hoping that insights will extend beyond the model:
“Unfortunately, there are no general or even plausible tractable models
of imperfect competition. The tractable models always involve some
set of arbitrary assumptions about tastes, technology, behavior, or all
three. This means that [   ] one must have the courage to be silly,
writing down models that are implausible in the details in order to
arrive at convincing higher-level insights.” (Krugman 1995, pp. 14-
15)
This section provides a short introduction to the Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competi-
tion framework. Before looking at the model itself, we will brieÀy discuss the pro-
blems that surround returns to scale in general, and the notion of externalities.
2.1 Returns to scale
A ¿rm’s production possibilities are summarized in its production function. If for an
amount A of a certain product a ¿rm uses inputs, whose quantities are summarized
in a vector B, the correspondence between different values of A and B de¿nes the
production function f B. For any B, we can evaluate the returns to scale of the ¿rm
by looking at the point elasticity







When B is larger than one, there are increasing returns to scale. Note that B is a
function of the inputs B. A ¿rm can have increasing returns for all possible B, but
also for a limited set of values of B.
On the level of the entire economy, increasing returns to scale are fairly undisputed.
In this case, we can think of f as a nation’s production function, with B indicating
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the supply of labor and capital. Increasing returns have been attributed to the division
of labor (Smith 1776) , splitting up complex production methods into multiple simple
steps (Young 1928, Stigler 1951) , and the fact that technological knowledge, once
produced, is nonexcludable (Romer 1990) . It would be a positive quality of any
economic model to have the possibility of including increasing returns on the macro
level.
However, much of today’s macroeconomic theory is derived explicitly from micro-
foundations (see, for instance, Romer 1993) . The occurrence of increasing returns
at the micro-level spells trouble. Helpman (1984) shows that the modeler needs to
specify a host of parameters to even start working: the conditions of ¿rm entry, the
heterogeneity of the good, and the type of market are just a few among them. The
outcome of the model is highly dependent on these assumptions, for instance, do
¿rms compete in a Bertrand– or a Cournot–market?
The simplest of these assumptions is that every sector is dominated by a single
monopolist, who fully exploits the increasing returns. Apart from the question of
realism, the presence of monopolists causes problems in a general-equilibrium model.
One source of problems is the occurrence of monopoly rents: the model needs to
specify how these rents are spent by the monopolist. In full competition, pro¿ts are
zero by de¿nition.
To avoid these issues altogether, one can assume that part of the returns to scale are
external to the ¿rm. The idea, originally from Marshall (1920) , separates internal
economies (‘those dependent on the resources of the individual houses of business
engaged in it’, p. 266) from external economies (‘those dependent on the general
development of the industry’, p. 266). The distinction allows economies of scale to
be incorporated in a consistent pro¿t-maximizing framework, where ¿rms perceive
their situation as one of full competition. Between externalities, we can ¿nd two types
(Scitovsky 1954): pecuniary externalities, those which are mediated by markets, and
non-pecuniary externalities, those which are transmitted in an other way.
Non-pecuniary externalities use a production function, at the ¿rm level, like f B 
f B X. Here, B again are the inputs and X is industry output (Helpman 1984).
Every single producer considers X as given, and controls only B. But f may have
increasing returns in B and X together.
Pecuniary externalities are more subtle. It could be possible that a producer, by
entering a market, increases the consumers’ utility because of the increased variety
that he/she provides. Although pro¿t opportunities were the ¿rm’s original motive
for entering, the variety effect may inÀuence the perceived price level faced by the
consumer, and alter the allocation of goods.
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Using non-pecuniary externalities, it is possible to construct a general-equilibrium
model that features increasing returns. Although this was indeed done (Chipman
1970) , such models have not been used extensively. Especially the use of non-
pecuniary externalities is thought suspect. By their nature, they are not observed
so that one can assume anything about them. Any possible outcome can thus be
‘doctored’ into the model.
2.2 Monopolistic competition
The key difference between full competition and monopolistic competition5 is in
the nature of the traded good. With full competition, the good is assumed to be
homogeneous, and its price the only criterion of selection. With MC, consumers
discern different varieties, and products from different producers are imperfect sub-
stitutes.6 Even if each individual producer faces increasing returns to scale in produc-
tion, the largest producer is not always able to push smaller competitors out of the
markets because substitution between products is limited.
In most applications of MC, consumer preferences are modelled as in Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977) 7. The quantities of goods xi consumed are aggregated in a CES
function,







with 0  A  1. By choosing suitable units of measurement for the different goods,
we can abstain from adding scale parameters to the different xi . It is clear that for
each of the goods, an increase in the amount consumed will increase total utility. If












producer ¿nds that she faces a demand elasticity J .
5 We will use the acronym MC for ‘monopolistic competition’ from now on.
6 Chamberlin (1956, p. 56) suggests that such elements as ‘the conditions surrounding its sale’, trade
marks and the seller’s reputation ‘may be regarded as [being purchased] along with the commodity
itself.’
7 Weitzman (1994) shows that this model is much related to the Lancaster (1979) ‘spatial
competition’ model, where each consumer has an ideal product and picks the one closest to it.
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If every variety sells for the same price p, all are purchased in the same amount. In
this case, formula (1) shows that utility is n1J1Ep. That is, an increase in variety
brings an increase in utility even if the nominal budget remains the same. Helpman
and Krugman (1985, p. 117) call this the ‘love-of-variety effect.’
The more varieties (n) there are, the less inÀuence a single producer’s price exerts on
the consumer’s real income. To completely eliminate every producer’s market power,
it is often assumed that the range of goods [0    n] is continuous, and each producer
is in¿nitely small. Though awkward, this assumption can be given some rigor. This
is done in appendix A.
Producers are usually assumed to face a ¿xed cost F and a variable cost a per
item produced. As the ¿xed cost per product declines with total production, they
are subject to an increasing returns technology. However, because of the downward
sloping consumer demand, output cannot grow inde¿nitely. Instead, producers maxi-
mize pro¿ts by setting marginal bene¿t equal to a. Facing demand generated by
the utility function in (1) this pricing strategy results in a mark-up over marginal
costs of size 1A . In equilibrium, all producers set the same price. The number of
active producers adjusts so that discounted pro¿ts are just enough to recoup the initial
investment F . With free entry, this means that n adjusts to drive pro¿ts to zero.
In an alternative interpretation of the same model, Ethier (1982) used the aggregator
function in (1) as a production function. Output U is made with inputs xi  each
input is produced by a single intermediate goods producer. The production function
belongs to a class of ¿rms that convert the intermediate goods into a ¿nal consumer
good. These ¿rms face constant returns to scale, as may be checked from (1), and
are in full competition. The ‘love-of-variety effect’ from above has now become
quite another thing: when entrance is free, there are increasing returns to scale at
the economy’s macro level.
2.3 Complementarities
Matsuyama (1993, 1995) discusses complementarities, the notion that “two phenom-
ena (or two actions, two activities) reinforce each other.” (1995, p. 702). Complemen-
tarities often arise in the MC framework.
As a speci¿c example, assume that in an economy, people consume a single product
that is made out of several intermediate goods with production function (1). That
is, there are n different intermediate goods, and total production is U . This is the
Ethier-setup from above. Assume also that intermediate-goods producers face ¿xed
costs F and variable costs Ax (the double use of parameter A is for mathematical
convenience). When there are L workers in the economy and there is free entry in the
8




with J de¿ned as above. The per capita production is increasing in n`, because
of increasing returns to scale on the macro level. In fact, per capita production is
n1J1.
Now if there exist two of these economies, with different intermediate goods, and they
open up for trade, both economies will see the range of available intermediate goods
increase. Because of this, both economies will experience an increase in production
per capita. When the two economies interact, they are complementary to each other.
This principle has been the basis for a large class of trade models, for instance in
Helpman and Krugman (1985) .
Hirschman (1958) discussed a related issue in the context of economic development.
In his terminology, there exist linkages between different ¿rms in a region. These
linkages concern the input-output relations among the ¿rms. Hirschman distinguishes
backward linkages when a ¿rm demands inputs from other ¿rms, and forward link-
ages when a ¿rm produces inputs for other ¿rms. The conjecture is that with positive
costs of transport for intermediate goods, linkages between ¿rms can make an agglo-
meration stable.
In fact, the conjecture requires that linked ¿rms are complementary to each other. It
is true that in general, the arrival of a downstream ¿rm can induce an upstream ¿rm
to expand. However, when this happens in a constant-returns world, the expansion
has no effects on the original activities of the upstream ¿rm, and the linkage is rather
weak. But should the upstream ¿rm exhibit increasing returns to scale, expansion
means that it can now operate at a higher level of ef¿ciency. In that case, the two
¿rms are complementary.
2.4 Review, and a look ahead
To study a complex phenomenon, it can be necessary to make a number of assumptions
that simplify the problem. We have argued that the CRS assumption ful¿lled such a
role in economics, as it allowed the derivation of a simple rule of conduct for ¿rms,
namely, marginal cost pricing. It also solved the problem of which market form would
prevail, in favor of full competition.
We have also introduced an alternative framework, based on a different assumption:
the MC setup. This setup is not any more general than full competition, the number of
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assumptions has even increased. Yet it is an interesting alternative because it allows
for complementarities and increasing returns to scale.
The short introduction above does not do justice to all the intricacies of MC, but that
is not the point of this survey. Rather, we now want to look at the application of this
framework to two ¿elds, growth theory and economic geography. The application
of MC to these ¿elds has allowed a large number of innovations. Those in growth
theory are discussed in the following Section, while those in economic geography
are the subject of Section 4. The two strands of literature are brought together in
Section 5.
3. Endogenous growth theory
In the introduction, we spoke brieÀy about the inability of traditional growth theory
to explain lasting growth as an economic phenomenon. I will now substantiate these
claims and introduce several alternatives that fall under the header of ‘new’ endoge-
nous growth theory.
The MC framework introduced above does not play a pivotal role throughout endog-
enous growth theory. The new growth models were erected for a number of reasons,
summarized by Romer (1994). Besides dissatisfaction with the inability of classical
models to explain lasting growth, Romer identi¿es two other causes. One is the
so-called convergence controversy: the (perceived) neoclassical prediction that poor
countries must catch up with rich countries was disputed by data that became available
around that time (Maddison 1982, Summers and Heston 1988). The other cause is
the fact that the neoclassical model is at odds with a number of easily observable
facts, facts which can only be explained if imperfect competition is incorporated.8
As the MC framework was the ¿rst to allow imperfect competition to be modelled in
a concise way, it has been the framework of choice for a lot of endogenous growth
models.
8 The facts are:
1. There are many ¿rms in the economy, not one monopolist.
2. Discoveries are nonrival. This makes them different from other inputs.
3. Physical activities can be replicated therefore production functions should be homogeneous
of degree one.
4. Technological advance comes from things that people do. It does not occur by itself.
5. Many individuals have market power and earn monopoly rent on discoveries even though they
are nonrival: informaton can be excludable.
Classical growth models are at odds with facts 4 and 5. Not all endogenous growth theories accomodate
all these facts.
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There are basically two ‘waves’ of models within the theory the ¿rst wave (started by
Romer 1986) describes growth as a process of ceaseless accumulation of factors. It
is possible to retain the assumption of perfect competition in these models, using
externalities. We will look at a sample model that employs the MC framework,
though. The second wave (started by Romer 1990) explains growth by organized
technological progress, and uses the MC framework together with an explicit sector
for R&D.
We ¿rst brieÀy look at the exogenous (Solow-) growth model and compare it with
some ¿rst-wave endogenous growth models. We then look at the second-wave models
in Section 3.2.
3.1 Neoclassical and endogenous models of accumulation
3.1.1 The macro level
The neoclassical growth model was developed independently in Solow (1956) and
Swan (1956), and the setup can be summarized quite concisely. The economy of a
country uses two factors, L and K , and produces a single output. A proportion 1 s
is consumed9, the rest is used to increase K :
Yt  F Kt  Lt (2)
AKt  sYt (3)
The aggregate production function F exhibits constant returns to scale, and the popu-
lation of laborers L grows exponentially at rate n. To each factor L and K taken alone,
the function has decreasing returns to scale. We may thus assume that the aggregate
production function is a representation of an indeterminate number of ¿rms that are
in full competition.
The qualitative results of the model of course depend on the shape of F . Solow
considers quite a number of different possibilities, but the one best remembered and
usually quoted is when F has the Inada properties (Fx  * 0 as x  0* and
F 0 c  F c 0  0). Because of the CRS assumption, we may write this model
in per capita terms by dividing both sides of (2) by L and substituting (3) in. This
leads to the differential equation
Ak  s f k nk
9 The assumption of a ¿xed rate of saving can be relaxed without altering the basic results of the
model. A model of intertemporal optimization was built by Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965) the
result may also be found in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Rensman (1996).
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where lowercase variables are per capita, and f k  F KL 1. By the Inada
assumption, f exhibits decreasing returns to scale, so that the equation has a single
solution k` to which all time-paths must converge. This implies that there exists a
level KL at which at which the extra capital only just compensates the increase in
population. This is the steady state to which the economy converges, and in which the







Decreasing returns model Linear model
k*
Figure 3.1: Direction of motion of k in two models of growth
of Figure 3.1. Capital per worker converges to the steady state level k` from every
initial level k0.
To stay in line with the empirical fact that the economy keeps growing, the neoclassi-
cal model is usually amended with exogenous technological growth. This growth
is necessarily Harrod-neutral (for a proof, see Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995, p. 54)
and can be incorporated by substituting Lt for Lt in (2), with Lt  At Lt . Regular
increases in A then result in a growing income per capita, even if the economy is
in the steady state. If the rate of growth of A is assumed constant it is possible to
estimate values for it for different countries using time series data. In another paper, I
estimated exogenous growth for the U.S. to be 00180 [0009] and for the Netherlands
00149 [0021] (standard errors in brackets, Knaap 1997).
The neoclassical model highlights the process of capital accumulation in a closed
economy and does not consider the interactions between several economies. It does
make a prediction about the dispersion of capital per head over several closed econo-
mies, if these economies can all be described by the same production and investment
functions: regardless of the initial level of capital, the economies will converge to the
same equilibrium, and thus to the same level of KL. This property of the model is
known as the convergence property.
The temporary nature of growth in this model has to do with the fact that the factors
that can be accumulated together face decreasing returns to scale. The more of these
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accumulable factors are around, the less their added productivity is. This is an as-
sumption of the model, and not necessarily a fact of life. The assumption was made
because the neoclassical model also considers the factor labor, which cannot be
accumulated by sheer economic means, and together the factors must exhibit CRS.
For, if they do not exhibit CRS, the assumption of perfect competition is inappropriate.
On the premise that we will discuss the appropriate market structure in Section 3.1.2,
let us now explore what would happen on a macro-level if all factors of production
could be accumulated. This implies a return to the models proposed by Harrod (1939)
and Domar (1946), who supposed that every addition to the stock of capital per
worker allows production to be increased proportionally. Then the per capita stock of
capital can never be too high, in the sense that additions to it are relatively unproduc-
tive. This can be seen when we substitute F Kt  Lt  AKt in formula (2) above.
The accumulable resources in this case must be understood to include human capital
and other production factors as well, besides capital in the narrow sense.
A graphical analysis of this linear model of production is in the right-hand panel of
Figure 3.1. It is clear that if all factors can be accumulated, while the CRS condition
still holds, we have speci¿ed a model of endogenous, ever-lasting growth.
An important point made by Rebelo (1991, p. 502) is that to achieve this result,
not every part of the economy needs to have constant returns. It is suf¿cient that
there exist a sector that uses a core of accumulable factors with a constant returns
technology. This sector then becomes the economy’s “engine of growth” as it pulls
the rest of the economy.
We will illustrate this and other issues by considering the following two-sector model
of an economy, taken from Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, p. 198):
Ct  AKt  =K Kt  A )t Kt:1 ut Ht:2 (4)
AHt  =H Ht  B 1 )t Kt@1 1 ut Ht@2 (5)
A box-arrow sketch of this model is in Figure 3.2. The different colors of the arrows
are used later for now consider them all equal.
We see that there are two sectors, one with production function f (formula 5) and
one with production function g (formula 4). Both sectors use two factors, K and H .
In principle, both factors K and H can be accumulated. The variables ), u and C are
control variables. The sectors differ in parameters :i , @i , A, and B and in the fact






















Figure 3.2: A box-arrow sketch of the two-sector model
given H0 and K0 and the parameters.
The complete model (4)-(5) is analyzed by Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1993) . They
derive the conditions under which this system can generate a steady state growth path,
that is, a solution path where all variables grow at a constant rate. It turns out that this




c  :2@1 (6)
A model whose parameters do not obey this condition either comes to rest at equili-
brium levels of H and K or ‘explodes’, which means that it generates in¿nitely large
state variables in ¿nite time, and the objective integral becomes improper. This knife-
edge condition on the parameters bothered Solow (1994) who discusses the value
of :1 in the AK model (see below). If that parameter is only slightly different than
assumed, condition (6) is not satis¿ed and the endogenous growth results vanish. It
causes him to call this type of theory “unpromising on theoretical grounds” (p. 51).
The model (4)-(5) has a number of well known special cases. We brieÀy list them
below.
Example 1. The AK model. For this model, the sector on the left in Figure 3.2 is
taken out. The other sector is assumed to have constant returns: :2  0, :1  )t  1.
Notice condition (6) is satis¿ed. This is a limiting case of the neoclassical Solow-
Cass-Koopmans model with f K   AK , hence the name. The steady state solution
is ACC  AKK  A  =K  I J . The model does not have any transitional
dynamics. The growth rate of C always remains positive under suitable parameters.

Example 2. The engine of growth. The two grey arrows in ¿gure 3.2 are taken
out. Both sectors have constant returns: @1  0, @2  1, :1  1  :2, =K AKt  0. Here, K represents the invariant stock of non-reproducible, non-depreciating
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capital goods (think of land, for instance) and H is the stock of factors that can be
accumulated. Again, the model only has a steady state solution and lacks transitional
dynamics. Rebelo (1991) shows that the solution is ACC  :1 AHH which is equal
to :1 B  =H  I  1 :1 1 J. It is natural to designate the sector producing
H as the engine of growth, as it is the constant returns accumulation of H that causes
C to grow. 
Example 3. The Lucas model. This is a slightly more general version of the ‘en-
gine’ model from Example 2, analyzed in Lucas (1988) . This time we take out only
the middle grey arrow. The parameters are @1  0, @2  1, =HK  0, :1:2  1. H
is understood to be human capital and K is conventional capital. Thus capital goods
play no role in the (constant returns) creation of human capital. The goods sector
shows increasing returns. In fact, Lucas assumes constant returns plus an external
effect of the average stock of human capital, so that a competitive equilibrium exists
(more on this below). The optimal steady state growth rate of consumption (with zero
population growth) is ACC  AKK   1:1<1:1 BIJ . Here, <  :1:21, the
size of the external effect. This shows that increasing returns are not essential for the
resulting endogenous growth, as <  0 still permits a positive value for < C . 
These models can be classi¿ed as to their stability. Because there are no transitional
dynamics in the ¿rst two models, a small perturbation of the initial value has lasting
effects. Because the growth rate of the accumulable factor is constant, the difference
between the solutions starting in F and F   grows exponentially (F is the initial
value of the relevant state variable, K and H for the AK and the ‘engine’ model,
respectively). A similar result holds for the Lucas model, although derivation of this
result is not trivial. See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, p. 184) and Mulligan and
Sala-i-Martin (1993, p. 758) .
3.1.2 The micro level
The models presented above pose a dif¿culty additional to the knife-edge condition
on the parameters. If they include increasing returns to an accumulable factor, the
usual fully competitive environment is no longer feasible in other words, the set of
supporting prices does not exist. We look at two approaches that have been used to
circumvent this problem. One is to introduce increasing returns only at the level of the
sector, and not of the ¿rm. The sectorial returns take the shape of externalities. The
other approach is to explicitly model the imperfect competition that arises because of
the increasing returns.
15
Externalities We discussed externalities in Section 2.1 as a means to reconcile CRS
and increasing returns. Some endogenous growth models use non-pecuniary externa-
lities to do just this. We have already mentioned the use of externalities in the Lucas
(1988) model, and we now look at the approach in Romer (1986). Because of a careful
speci¿cation of the externality setup, the model does not suffer from the knife-edge
condition (6).
The production function for a representative ¿rm is F ki  K  xi with ki the state of
knowledge available to ¿rm i and xi a vector of additional factors (capital, labor).
The variable K is the aggregate level of knowledge
3N
i1 ki which can be used by all
¿rms to some extent because knowledge is partly non-rival and non-excludable. It is
assumed that F has constant returns to the factors ki and xi , and increasing returns
to all three factors. However, each ¿rm takes the value of K as given when making
its decisions. Output can be consumed or invested in ki (xi is constant). The latter
goes through the knowledge production function: Akk  g Ik. The function g is
increasing and bounded from above by a ¿nite constant M. These conditions on g
prevent the ‘explosion’ that the models above suffered from: a ¿rm can never let its
stock of knowledge grow at a faster rate than M so that ki and K cannot reach in¿nity
in ¿nite time. Note that the g-functions above were usually linear in the state variable.
Romer ¿nds that the socially optimal solution is different from the competitive solu-
tion because the latter does not take the external effects into account. Both solutions
do generate endogenous growth, albeit that the rate of growth is larger in the optimal
solution. The competitive solution is properly de¿ned in all models that satisfy the
above speci¿cation.
Monopolistic Competition As an alternative to the use of externalities above, Romer
(1987) explicitly introduces markets that are monopolistically competitive the model
is very similar to that in Section 2.3. There exists an all-purpose capital good Z ,
which is transformed into a continuum of n` intermediate goods this is done by
a continuum of ¿rms (see appendix A). These intermediate goods are then used
as inputs for the ¿nal good. The ¿nal good can again be added to Z or can be
consumed. Consumers maximize utility (a function of consumption) intertemporally.
The production function in the ¿nal goods sector is as described in section 2.2. An
increasing number of intermediate inputs (n`) increases output as in the example
in Section 2.3. Varieties x i are produced using an increasing returns production
function.
The most important characteristic of this model is that output Y turns out to be a
linear function of the stock Z . This is because the ef¿cient scale of the intermediate
producers does not change as Z changes, so n` is linear in Z . As Y is linear in n`
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this means that the model behaves much as though it were the AK model above,
and generates stable endogenous growth. It also suffers from the above-mentioned
drawbacks, notably the fact that it is parameter-unstable. However, constant returns
of Y to Z seem a little less “luck” (cf. Solow 1994, p. 51) than above, as they can
be defended on economic grounds rather than just being mathematically convenient.
Also, this model became the backbone of more advanced growth models. We will
come across those models in the next section.
3.2 Growth through innovation
Above, economic growth was mostly brought about by an ever increasing supply of
factors. In Romer’s (1987) model, an increase in the number of varieties played a
role, but this increase was ‘free,’ i.e. no sacri¿ces needed to be made to discover
the new varieties the increase was a matter of ef¿cient scale. Yet stylized fact #4
(footnote 8) speci¿ed that ‘technological advance comes from things that people do.’
The second wave of growth models thus concentrated on a situation where R&D
absorbs resources and new varieties are discovered in return.
New varieties can be substitutes or complements to older ones. In growth theory
parlance one thus distinguishes horizontal and vertical innovation. The term ‘hori-
zontal innovation’ is from Grossman and Helpman (1991), and the ¿rst model in this
direction was drafted by Judd (1985). It is replicated here.








x ) tA d)
u
dt . (7)
The only factors of production are labor, which is constant at L, and the known range
of varieties V t. For each variety there holds that one unit can be produced using
one unit of labor. The range of varieties V t grows through R&D, whose only input
also is labor. It is assumed that AV  LR&Dk.10
There holds that A  1, so that in equilibrium the quantities x ) are the same across







subject to k AV  L  yV .
10 Note that there is no uncertainty involved in research. This rather quaint assumption is maintained
through much of the growth-through-innovation literature.
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The solution (see Judd 1985) is that the economy converges to a stationary state
where both y and V are constant. That is, there exists an optimal variety of goods,
and once this variety has been attained innovation comes to a halt.
It is possible to see why innovation stops if we compare the problem to the basic
monopolistic competition model of section 2.2. In that setup, an increase in that
number of ¿rms lowers each ¿rm’s pro¿t margin. Pro¿t is used to repay a ¿xed cost
that is associated with entry. A situation of too many producers leads to pro¿ts that
are too low to recoup the initial investment. Hence there exists an optimum number
of producers. In this model, the ¿xed cost associated with entry is the labor that must
be hired to conduct R&D. If that cost cannot be repaid because pro¿t margins are too
low, innovation stops.
Note that the MC market form is essential in this model because, as opposed it full
competition, it allows producers to make a pro¿t. Those pro¿ts can be used to pay off
the initial R&D expenses. Without the possibility to price higher than marginal costs,
innovation would never occur.
3.2.1 Horizontal innovation, endogenous growth
One way to keep the economy growing in the model above, is by lowering the costs of
innovation as the number of varieties increases. If the outcome of the model should be
a constant growth rate g of the number of varieties, and we know that AV  LR&Dk,
then we can deduce
AV
V
 g  LR&D
kV
g constant " kV constant
So, if the R&D productivity parameter k1 is proportional to the number of varieties
V , we can have everlasting growth.
Romer (1990) presents an adapted version of his model in Romer (1991) that
“emphasizes the importance of human capital in the research process” (p. S78). Like
above, it features three sectors: R&D, intermediate and ¿nal goods. Knowledge has a
rival component H and a non-rival component A the latter can be interpreted as the
‘state of technology’ and is allowed to grow without bounds.
In the production of ¿nal output Y , human capital H plays a role next to labor L and
a continuum of intermediate goods xi:





(notice the similarity to formula 7 above). The stock of H is split up in a part HY
that works in the ¿nal goods sector, and a part HA that works in the R&D sector. The
interval over which xi is positive has size A, the level of technology. An increase
in A, that is, a rise in the level of technology, does not render older types of the
intermediate good obsolete. This is due to the additively separable form of (8).
In line with the derivation above, the technology used in the R&D sector is such that
A changes according to
AA  =  HA  A (9)
This form is justi¿ed by claiming that a larger stock of knowledge will enhance
current research possibilities. The model is closed by specifying that the stock of
intermediate goods K  5 A0 xidi evolves according to AKt  Yt Ct .
Romer’s analysis shows that the model speci¿ed above yields unbounded endogenous
growth. This is caused by the assumption of constant returns to scale in equation (9)
above. With respect to this assumption, Romer writes:
“...in this sense, unbounded growth is more like an assumption than a
result of the model. [...] Whether opportunities in research are actually
petering out, or will eventually do so, is an empirical question that this
kind of theory cannot resolve.”
3.2.2 Vertical innovation, endogenous growth
Aghion and Howitt (1992) consider a model of growth that features vertical innova-
tion. Newer types of intermediates replace the older types, and therefore the model
represents the concept of Creative Destruction introduced by Schumpeter (1942).
The economy consists of three sectors: the R&D sector, the intermediate goods sector
and the sector that produces consumption goods. The trade-off in the economy is the
decision how many workers are allotted to work in R&D instead of the intermediate
goods sector. This number depends on the expected pro¿tability of innovations.
A new intermediate good completely replaces the older type. The inventor is the
only producer of the goods, and is thus allowed to earn some monopoly rents until
the next innovation takes place. The time until the next innovation is random and
exponentially distributed, and depends negatively on the number of people working
in R&D. The marginal product of an extra R&D worker is decreasing, so that there
exists an optimal number of people engaged in research and development.
There is only one kind of uncertainty in the model, namely the time of arrival of a
new technology. The increase in the level of technology, caused by the invention, is
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¿xed. By de¿ning a ‘period’ as the elapsed time between two innovations, the authors
in effect make the monopoly rent earned off the inventions the random variable in the
model.
Without being explicit about such things as the aggregate production function, Aghion
and Howitt (1992) examine the motives for investing in R&D and ¿nd that, depending
on the ‘arrival function’ of new technologies, there may exist a Àuctuating or steady
(possibly zero) number of researchers in the economy. Endogenous growth is implied
as soon as there is a positive number of researchers active, and its rate is determined
by both endogenous and exogenous variables.
3.3 Empirical tests
In this section we will mostly at empirical tests of the implications of the above
models. As some of the results came out negatively, interest in the neoclassical Solow
model was revived in the early 1990s. The results of such interest can be found in
Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) and Nonneman and Vanhoudt (1996) .
As Pack (1994) notices, much early empirical research on endogenous growth models
is conducted in the neoclassical framework. Thus, instead of testing the new growth
theory directly, it is only used as a possible alternative when the Solow model fails. A
¿rst direct test of the theory is performed by Jones (1995b) , who tests the time-series
predictions of new growth theory. The evidence is collected in two rounds.
The models of this section have the property that a permanent increase in investment
causes a permanent increase in the economy’s rate of growth. Or, even stronger, the
two variables are linearly related. This is easily seen with the AK and the Lucas
model, as the rate of growth of capital and the rate of growth of consumption are
the same. The result does not hold for the engine-of-growth model. Jones (1995b,
p. 500) shows that the growth rates of selected OECD countries are stationary
variables, whereas a unit root in the OECD investment rates can only be rejected
in four out of 15 cases. Almost all investment rates show a positive trend. This
contradicts the (supposed) linear relationship between investment rates and growth
rates. Further time series estimations show that the effects of an increase in the
investment rate can only be observed for eight years after the shock, much less than
the proposed everlasting effect.
The testable proposition of the R&D-based models of section 3.2 is that the growth
rate of an economy is linearly related to the number of people active in the R&D
sector. Using data on the number of researchers in the U.S., Germany, Japan and
France, Jones (1995b, p. 517) again shows a strong upward trend in these explanatory
variables, whereas the rate of growth of their respective countries remains stationary.
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These two results can be seen as a rejection of the testable propositions that came out
of the endogenous growth models. Jones (1995a) proposes to ‘¿x’ the R&D-based
model by writing equation (9) in Romer’s (1990) model as
AA  =  HDA  AM
If D, M  1 then the model will no longer exhibit endogenous growth but instead
settle down in an equilibrium. As Jones (1995a, p. 766) puts it, “   M  1 represents
a completely arbitrary degree of increasing returns and [   ] is inconsistent with a
broad range of time series data on R&D and TFP growth ” (see also Romer’s quote in
section 3.2.1). The model proposed by Jones (1995a) can best be seen as an extended
version of the Solow (1956) setup, with all its asymptotic characteristics.
3.4 Review
We have seen that classical growth models that use the CRS paradigm explain growth
through accumulation, but this growth cannot last forever without exogenous propel-
ling. Accumulation-based models can explain lasting growth if they have constant
returns to all accumulable factors. The micro-foundations for these models use exter-
nalities or an MC-setup.
The second wave of endogenous growth models explains growth not by accumulation
of factors, but by technological progress. Virtually all these models use the MC
framework.
Some critical notes can be placed about endogenous growth models. The scale-effects
that they predict are not observed, and they are parameter-unstable. Despite the critical
notes above, at the time of writing, endogenous growth theory is still very much alive.
It turns out that the spirit of the models can be maintained while accommodating
empirical facts (see Aghion and Howitt 1998, chapter 12) . And the ability of the
models to handle a number of questions that exogenous growth theory cannot answer
(questions concerning the long run growth rate, for instance) has made them popular
with empirical researchers.
4. Economic geography
Ironically, economic geography or location theory has been a rather peripheral ¿eld
of study within economics. In part, the small amount of attention for issues of location
can be attributed to the institutional, geographical and sociological factors that play
such an important role in the problem. Yet over the years, many interesting results
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have been obtained using methods of economics. We look at the foundations of
location theory in Section 4.1. Then we turn to a new class of models that involve
monopolistic competition and increasing returns in Section 4.2.
4.1 Foundations of location theory
The earliest theory of location can be divided in two branches (Greenhut 1956): least-
cost theory, oriented on the supply side, and spatial competition theory, oriented on
the demand side of the economy. The striking characteristic of least-cost theories is
that they start by assuming a form of agglomeration they do not explain why the
agglomeration came about in the ¿rst place. This problem is tackled to some extent
by spatial competition theories, as well as by the theories based on externalities and
those that use increasing returns. We look at the different theories in chronological
order.
Least-cost or land use theory starts with assuming that all demand in the economy is
located at a single point. This can be a mining town demanding agricultural produce
as in Von Thünen (1842) , or a central business district in which all trade is conducted,
as in Fujita (1986) . Transportation is costly, and costs increase with distance from
the center, r . From their production function and the costs of transport, suppliers can
compute how much rent they want to pay as a function of r . This information is
aggregated in a rent gradient, according to which the suppliers settle. The approach
is re¿ned by Weber (1909) to account for the location of raw materials, and Alonso
(1964) adds, among other, endogenous lot size. Many models of urban structure still
use this setup.
Spatial competition or locational interdependence theory, on the other hand, does
not assume the existence of a center. Rather, (consumer) demand is distributed over
locations and (zero-size) producers are looking for the optimal spot. With land rent
out of the model, this approach clearly deals with questions of attraction and repulsion
among different ¿rms. The founding paper is Hotelling (1929) , and shows that two
producers of a homogeneous good will locate next to each other halfway a line
with evenly spread consumers. This is not the socially optimal situation. Chamberlin
(1956, pp. 260-265) shows that increasing the number of sellers in this problem will
cause their dispersion, converging to the optimal dispersion as the number of sellers
goes to in¿nity. Gabszewicz and Thisse (1986) provide a survey of this method.
The two approaches above may be combined. Lösch (1967) and Greenhut (1952)
introduce pro¿t-maximization as the relevant criterion. Given that demand and supply
conditions may vary with location, this tends to make the problem less tractable.
There exist fewer general rules on spatial dispersion than in the above, simpli¿ed,
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analysis. An important limitation of both these approaches is the assumption that
consumers do not change their location in response to the suppliers’ whereabouts.
4.2 Models with endogenous agglomeration
The traditional location theory in the preceding section has said very little about
the causes of agglomeration. Often, nonmarket externalities are thought to be an
important factor in the creation of agglomerations. Such hard-to-measure concepts
as informational and technical spillovers between ¿rms, or in general informational
exchanges between agents (Fujita and Thisse 1996, p.347) cause people to cluster
together. The reason for clustering is the fact that the amount of spillovers between
two ¿rms is assumed to decline rapidly with distance. The spillovers are embodied
in such acts as face-to-face talks and casual inspection of the other ¿rm’s production
site. Nonmarket externalities are emphasized in Jacobs (1969) .
The problem with the above conjectures about the causes of agglomeration is that
they are dif¿cult to verify. Saying that agglomerations are caused by agglomeration
economies is close to a tautology. The predictive power of the theory is therefore
small. It is preferable to have a model where agglomerations are a result of more
fundamental properties like the way people consume and produce.
It turns out that such a model can be constructed: the model includes pecuniary
externalities as a cause for agglomeration and uses the monopolistic competition
framework of section 2.2. The complementarities between different producers located
at the same spot helps to make their combined presence an equilibrium. The principle,
complementarity-induced agglomeration, was recognized by Krugman (1979) in a
paper about monopolistic competition and international trade. In his model, where the
MC setup was slightly different from above11, when trade was prohibited but factors
were mobile,
[   ] there will be an incentive for workers to move to the region that
already has the larger labor force. [   ] In equilibrium all workers will
have concentrated in one region or another. (p. 20)
It is not very dif¿cult to see the agglomerative tendencies using the model from
section 2.2. Suppose that there are two regions in which economies with an MC
structure exist, and that trade is prohibited. The number of ¿rms in each region is
11 Speci¿cally, the subutility-function xA is replaced by a function ) x. The elasticity of demand is
now ) )) ))x , and it is assumed that the elasticity decreases in x (this does not happen with the xA
form). The assumption leads to the result that wages are higher in the most populated region with the
xA form this is not true, unless the wages are corrected for the local price index.
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linear in the number of inhabitants (Section 2.3) the aggregate price index faced by








which is decreasing in n (this is due to the ‘love-of-variety-effect’). If inhabitants are
given the choice where to live, they will move to the more populated region. Hence,
agglomeration results naturally.
The ¿rst to design explicit models of location based on MC were Fujita (1988) and
Rivera-Batiz (1988) . These models featured agglomeration economies as well as
land rents based on a least-cost framework (see Section 4.1 above). Despite the
countervailing force of the rents, Rivera-Batiz shows that for some parameters, “[t]he
economy’s population [   ] ends up completely in city m” (1988, p. 148) .
Such complete agglomeration would become the hallmark property of a later class of
models, then under the header of ‘new economic geography.’ The complementarities
that cause agglomeration arise because of the MC framework, but they may travel
through different markets. Ottaviano and Puga (1997) classify the models according
to these media. They discern migration linkages, input-output linkages and intertem-
poral linkages.
A model that is based on migration linkages is presented by Krugman (1991a, 1991b).
The Krugman model has two sectors, one mobile MC sector and a second sector
which is immobile and fully competitive. The linkages work as follows: for a ¿rm, it
is preferable to be in a location with many inhabitants. This is because the inhabitants
demand the ¿rm’s product, and demand is increased if the ¿rm is closer (because of
transport costs). For people, on the other hand, it is preferable to be close to the largest
concentration of ¿rms, as we saw above, because they are subject to ‘love of variety.’
Being close to many ¿rms lowers the price index they face and increases real wage.
Dependent on the relative size of the two sectors, transport costs, and substitution
elasticities, the equilibrium may either be complete agglomeration of the mobile
sector, or an even spread. A small change in the parameters may switch the equilibri-
um, so that ‘catastrophic’ changes are possible.
Venables (1996), in a model without labor, shows that it is possible that input-output
linkages between ¿rms ful¿ll the same role as a mobile workforce. Using a monopo-
listic competition setup for both an upstream and a downstream sector, Venables
shows that it is possible that an increase in the size of one industry brings the other
industry to a higher level of ef¿ciency. The model’s conclusions remain the same in
Krugman and Venables (1995), who extend the framework by collapsing the upstream
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and downstream industries into one layer. The monopolistic competitive market structure
is preserved by a speci¿c form of the ¿nal demand function. Amiti (1997) shows that
a similar outcome may be obtained without the use of an MC framework. In her
model, a scale effect arises because of a pricing game that is played between ¿rms
in a sector. An increase in the number of ¿rms has a negative effect on collusion and
ups the sector’s ef¿ciency.
Aspects of factor accumulation can also serve as a medium for agglomerative tenden-
cies. They are explored in Section 5 on dynamic economic geography.
Even though the mechanics, as well as the economic rationale of the above models
are substantially different, there are some common characteristics that are worth
spelling out. The most important outcome is that in all three models, the combination
increasing returns - transport costs spells agglomeration. Both are a necessary factor.
If there is no gain in size, then ¿rms may as well split up and be spread out over space
without any loss in ef¿ciency. If transport costs are zero, then the whole concept
of location does not matter in economic decisions (this is the spatial impossibility
theorem referred to in Section 1).
The relation between transport costs and agglomeration tendencies is often found to
be an ‘inverted U ’ (Junius 1996, Ottaviano and Puga 1997, Venables 1996) . At very
high transport costs each region is self suf¿cient and no interaction takes place. At
intermediate transport costs the above agglomeration effects are stronger, and at very
low transport costs the ‘centrifugal’ forces congestion and factor market competition
take over and ¿rms spread out again.
4.3 Empirical tests
Due to its nonlinear structure, the empirical evaluation of the above economic geogra-
phy models is quite laborious. Davis and Weinstein (1998a, 1998b) use the ‘home
market effect’ discussed by Krugman (1980) to put a trade model to the test. Their
model uses the Heckscher-Ohlin theory at the level of industries, and allows for a
number of alternatives at the level of individual goods.
The home market effect may be observed if a region or a country has a large idiosyn-
cratic demand for a particular good. In the Heckscher-Ohlin theory of trade, where
the production structure is driven by factor endowments, such a region will in general
be an importer of that good. The presence of an extraordinary level of demand does
not affect the location of production. Even though local producers will satisfy the
demand to some extent, they will not cover all of it, hence the importer status of the
region.
In a world where producers only use one factor and compete within an MC framework,
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things are different, and the home market effect surfaces: the region with the large
demand for a speci¿c good will be a net exporter of that good. The producers, rather
than being driven by factor scarcity, realize that they are best off producing in only
one location because of returns to scale, and prefer the region with the largest demand
because of transport costs. Other regions are then serviced from this one, hence the
net export result. In terms of the model, a large demand component is matched more
than one for one by the region’s production.
In the empirical speci¿cation, the authors lump together several goods into an ‘indu-
stry,’ explain industry location by endowments and look how the production of parti-
cular goods within the allotted industry production is distributed. In Davis and Weinstein
(1998a), the data come from the OECD and concern national manufacturing pro-
duction of the member countries. Results are meagre, in the sense that most trade can
be explained by the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin model. When the model is estimated
with data for regions in Japan (Davis and Weinstein 1998b), the results are quite
different. When the model is estimated for each of the industries separately, two out
of six feature a marked ‘home market effect.’12 The authors indicate that this could
be the result of lower transport costs and greater factor mobility at the regional level.
The tests by Davis and Weinstein must be seen as a ¿rst coarse investigation into the
relevance of economic geography models. Many assumptions are made: at what level
of aggregation do ‘industries’ stop, and do we observe ‘goods’ where the market
is monopolistically competitive? What goods form an industry together? How do
arbitrary de¿nitions of regions and groups of goods affect the results? It seems wise
to defer judgement until more empirical evidence is available.
5. Dynamic economic geography
This review paper has shown how the monopolistic competition model (Section 2)
made possible new ways of modelling economic growth (Section 3) and economic
geography (Section 4). So far however, we have discussed growth models without an
explicit geographical dimension, and static geography models. It is only natural to
combine the two strands of the literature, which are based on the same framework.
Some research has indeed been done in this direction. We survey it in this section,
organizing the models along the type of medium that is used to transmit the agglomer-
ation linkages (these media were discussed in Section 4.2). We start with a model by
12 These industries include: transportation equipment, general machinery, electrical machinery
and precision instruments. Indeed these skill-intensive goods seem to be among the ones where
differentiation is possible, as opposed to manufactured bulk goods.
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Martin and Ottaviano (1996b), where the linkage runs through the R&D sector in
a way reminiscent of Krugman and Venables (1995), in Section 5.1. A model by
Baldwin and Forslid (1997) where the labor market is the medium, is the subject of
Section 5.2. Other models are in 5.3.
5.1 Agglomeration through the R&D sector
The model by Martin and Ottaviano (1996b) has two locations and three sectors: a
full-competition agricultural sector, an MC industrial sector and a sector for R&D. It
is the latter sector that is most interesting.
The R&D sector is fully competitive. The output of the sector is patents each patent
can be used to manufacture a variety in the industrial sector, the total number of
varieties is n. The productivity of the R&D sector increases as n gets larger. These
qualities are similar to the Romer-Grossman-Helpman models of Section 3.2.1. The
only input to the R&D sector is the composite good D that is the output of the
industrial sector. This creates a linkage between the two sectors akin to the linkages
in Krugman and Venables (1995) and Venables (1996). Wherever ¿rms from the
industrial sector are abundant, the costs of R&D are low. And wherever R&D is
conducted, the demand for industrial goods is higher. The linkage causes agglome-
ration of industrial and R&D ¿rms in the same location.
Consumers in this model maximize an intertemporal utility function that depends
on the consumption of the agricultural and the industrial good. The model has two
types of solutions. In one solution, both locations have exactly the same number of
industrial producers. R&D is conducted in both locations. This solution is unstable.
The other solution has all R&D taking place in one location, where also the majority
of the industrial producers are active.
It is in the second, unbalanced, solution the rate of growth is higher. This is intuitive:
if industrial producers are spread evenly the industrial composite costs the same in
both locations, say, c. In case of an imbalance, there always is a location in which the
composite is cheaper than c. Because R&D uses only the composite, an even spread
of the industrial producers maximizes production costs and minimizes growth.
An important conclusion of the model by Martin and Ottaviano (1996b) is that the
rate of growth inÀuences the location decision, and the location decision inÀuences
the rate of growth. This puts models in which both are treated separately at a disad-
vantage. The fact that the interaction causes agglomeration of industrial activity is in
line with the quote by Myrdal on page 3.
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5.2 Agglomeration through the labor market
The model in the previous section assumed that there is no migration between the
locations. At the other extreme, migration is the cornerstone in the model by Baldwin
and Forslid (1997) , just as it is in Krugman (1991a, 1991b) .
The assumptions are roughly the same as above, except that the R&D sector now
uses only labor as an input. Again, the input requirement decreases as the stock
of knowledge gets larger. However, the spillovers are only regional the stock of
knowledge consists of the number of ¿rms in ones own location only.
In the long run, the linkage now works as follows: wherever the most ¿rms are is
where the consumer price index is lowest. Personnel has an incentive to move to this
location. So do all ¿rms in the (competitive) R&D sector, because the costs of R&D
depend negatively on the available pool of knowledge (in this case, the number of
¿rms). On the other hand, where most people are is where ¿rms like to be because of
the demand that people exercise, and because of the larger labor market that the ¿rms
can draw from.
Again, there are two types of equilibrium in this model. In one, all activity is evenly
divided between locations, and both locations grow at the same speed. The other
equilibrium has all R&D and most labor and industrial ¿rms in one location, the
other deprived of most activity.
It turns out that the ¿rst equilibrium (the even spread) is very unstable, even at
prohibitive trade costs. This was not the case in the Krugman (1991a, 1991b) models.
Contrary to the static economy, the dynamic economy will agglomerate into one
location for all possible parameters.
In this model, the R&D sector does not constitute a part of the linkages, as it did
above. However, it does react to the outcome. In the long term, all R&D is concentrated
in the agglomeration, because it is the cheaper place to work. This does not necessarily
affect the location of the industrial ¿rms developed by the R&D sector, as the patents
are valid in both locations. Thus, the R&D sector reacts to the linkages, but is not a
part of it.
The interplay between growth and location shows up in this model as well. When all
R&D is done in the same location, all R&D ¿rms add to the same stock of knowledge.
This leads to faster rates of growth than if the advances are divided over two separate
stocks of knowledge, because the ef¿ciency of the R&D sector increases with K .
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5.3 Other models of growth and geography
The models in this section integrate growth and location theories as above, but they
differ from the models in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 in the fact that growth and location
do not interact. As we saw above, the interaction of growth and location was the
most interesting aspect of the hybrid models, so we do not analyze the models in this
Section to a great extent.
Martin and Ottaviano (1996a) develop a model where migration does not occur.
There are three sectors, agriculture, industrial and R&D. The MC industrial sector
uses patents as in Section 3.2.1. The competitive R&D sector that develops the patents
uses labor and the pool of knowledge. Patents can be used in any location and are
not subject to transport costs. If the R&D sector has access to all knowledge in the
economy (global spillovers), then R&D is conducted in both locations. If there are
only local spillovers, the R&D sector agglomerates. The developed ¿rms will be set
up in both locations, though.
The model is a ¿rst attempt to merge theories of growth and location. The structure
of the economy (industrial and agricultural production at the two locations) is so
rigid that it does not change much under the different growth regimes, so that the
interaction is limited to the location of the R&D sector.
Englmann and Walz (1995) construct a model with two locations without transport
costs. The geographic structure plays a role however, because the knowledge pool
is different between the two regions. This leads to a situation with nontraded inputs,
where each location has its own intermediates. The initially larger region becomes
the industrial center, whereas the other becomes a peripheral region. If there are
interregional knowledge spillovers, so that inputs still are not traded but R&D can
use them, many solutions become possible.
In this model, devoid of transport costs, it is the size of the knowledge pools that
steers the regional development. Knowledge pools contain nontraded inputs, so that
the factor that causes agglomeration is not traded itself. Though interesting, this is
fundamentally different from the models of Section 4 and is the subject of another
branch of literature (see, for instance Rivera-Batiz and Romer 1991) .
6. Conclusions
In this survey paper, we introduced the monopolistic competition framework as the
foundation of two new strands of literature, on the one hand endogenous growth
theory, and on the other hand economic geography. Both theories use the fact that
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MC allows scale economies to be used in a model of general equilibrium.
In our survey of endogenous growth, we showed that early models were based on the
endless accumulation of resources, as in exogenous growth models. Later versions
stressed technological progress as the source of growth. Progress can take the form
of horizontal innovations and vertical innovations.
In the literature on economic geography, linkages between ¿rms and consumers,
and between ¿rms themselves, play an important role. The different models can
be classi¿ed as to the type of linkage they use. Most models predict a dramatic
agglomeration at certain parameter values.
Because both strands of literature rest on the same foundation, and describe related
phenomena, it is only logical to incorporate the two. We surveyed several attempts
to that end. It turns out that the interplay between growth and location upsets the
predictions of either literature by itself. Stable equilibria in static geography models
turn out to be unstable in a dynamic context the rate of growth again is inÀuenced
by the location pattern, which depends on initial values.
Studies that investigate the empirical value of both literatures are not overly enthusi-
astic. Whereas CRS-based theory stands up to the data in a reasonable way, many
effects predicted by MC are not measured at all. However, this may be due to a lack
of testing methodology capable of dealing with the nonlinear nature of the models.
Tests can only be conducted on speci¿c linear predictions of the model. It is unclear
to which extent a refutation of such a prediction constitutes a problem for the whole
body of theory.
It seems that the combination of endogenous growth theory and economic geography
is a promising ¿eld of research. The scattered results available so far indicate that
more work needs to be done before any swaying conclusions can be drawn.
]
Appendix A:
A continuum of goods
The derivation of the equilibrium in the monopolistic competition framework holds
in general ‘when n is large.’ This can be an awkward assumption do we really need,
in economic terms, an endless array of goods to work with this model?
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The usual interpretation is that really, all we need is to be able to re¿ne and differentiate
goods enough. The range can remain the same, but we ought to be able to divide
goods into as many different subtypes as we need. Mathematically, this means that
we look at a continuum of goods x  j de¿ned on a real interval [0 n]. In principle,
each good x  j with j + [0 n] can be identi¿ed as a different variety. Quantities
of goods, however, are only de¿ned over intervals of j . The quantity x 3  1 is
meaningless, but x j  1 for all j + [01 02] is a positive quantity.
How do our maximand U and the budget restriction change when we work with a
continuum of goods? They can be derived as limiting cases of their discrete versions.
Suppose we call all the goods x j with 0 n j  n1 good 1, all the goods with
n1 n j  n2 good 2, and introduce a set of numbers V  
n0 n1 n2     nQ like
this, with n0  0 and nQ  n. If two goods belong to the same interval, they are
purchased in the same amount and priced the same.13 With this set, we are back in
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x i p i di (11)
We see that there are two ways in which the number of goods can increase. By picking
a larger set V, we re¿ne the de¿nition of the goods, and allow for more price and
quantity differentiation. By increasing n, the range of goods is increased with the
introduction of new varieties that can be purchased instead of the older set.
The monopolistic competition setup is usually introduced as in formulas (10) and
(11), without a speci¿c set V de¿ned. To retrieve the results that hold in the integer
case, however, we need to imagine such a set ourselves.
Suppose we want to maximize function U from formula (10) under the restriction
13 That is, we have xi and x j with nk1 n i  nk and nk1 n j  nk , and both are purchased
in the amount xk .
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The problem is hard to solve when we stick with the integral notation, but we can
imagine that the differentiation between goods only goes as far as a set V, which we
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.
Differentiate with respect to xi and set equal to zero to ¿nd
; ni  ni1 xiA1  D ni  ni1 p i  0 "
AxiA1  Dp i .
Note that we may divide by ni  ni1 because the requirements for V have it greater




If we substitute this into formula (11) we get that
x i  Ep i
J5 n
0 p j1Jd j
where J  1 1 A  1.
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